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Abstract
Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evalu-
ation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with
limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent
earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes only
signals of good news and bad news of the agent’s action.
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1 Introduction
When outputs are nonverifiable in a principal-agent relation, credibility of com-
pensation payments may be achieved by the principal’s commitment to pay a con-
stant amount to all agent and a third party. MacLeod (2003) shows that in a
single-agent case this leads to wage compression in the sense that only under the
poorest outcome the agent’s wage is reduced. This wage compression result also
holds when an additional verifiable performance signal is available (Rajan and
Reichelstein 2009, Ederhof 2010)
I show that this extreme form of bonus payments in general only applies if
limited liability is not an issue. With binding liability constraints the set of out-
comes for which the agent is punished is enlarged up to the case where a bonus is
paid only under good news in the sense of Milgrom (1981). Thus, while the wage
compression result seems to comply with some empirical evidence, there also ex-
ist situations which are in line with a more straightforward economic intuition to
pay rewards only if a positive signal on the agent action is observed. The paper
therefore provides a rationale for the existence of a whole range of different bonus
agreements, including both lenient and more demanding requirements.
2 The model
The model generalizes MacLeod’s (2003) model of subjective performance eval-
uation, and mainly builds on the assumptions of Rogerson’s (1985) analysis of the
standard moral hazard problem with verifiable information.
So consider a principal (she) who hires an agent to fulfil a certain task on
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her behalf. If the agent (he) accepts the contract offer, he chooses an action a
from a real interval A = [a; a]. The principal’s gross benefit from the action is
B(a) with B0 > 0 and B00  0. Rather than B the principal observes a signal
Y 2 fy1; : : : ; yng of the agent’s action, the probability pi(a) = ProbfY = yi j
ag; i = 1; : : : ; n of which depends on the agent’s action choice. Assume that pi
is strictly positive and twice continuously differentiable for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
and that the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is fulfilled such that
p0i(a)=pi(a) < p
0
i+1(a)=pi+1(a) holds for i = 1; : : : ; n   1 (see Milgrom 1981).
To exclude message sending games, I assume that the agent does not observe Y .1
Furthermore, I assume that the convexity of the distribution function condition
(CDFC) holds, i.e. that P 00i (a) > 0, where Pi(a) =
Pi
j=1 pj(a) is the cumulative
distribution function of Y under action a. Since most contracts derived here will
have the structure of a simple bonus contract, it will be convenient to introduce
the survival function Ri(a) = 1  Pi(a).
The contract between the principal and the agent fixes paymentswi = w(yi); i =
1; : : : ; n contingent on the observed realization of the signal Y . To make the pay-
ment credible, the principal commits to pay a certain sum w  maxifwigi=1;:::;n
and to transfer the residual amount w   wi to a third party. By this arrangement,
he has no incentive to misreport the observed signal.
The agent’s preferences can be described by the utility function V (wi; a) =
U(wi)   C(a), where U(wi) is his utility from money and C(a) is his cost of
effort. The agent is risk averse and increasingly effort averse, i.e. U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0,
C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0. His outside options are described by his reservation utility
1This assumption is similar to that in section II.b of MacLeod (2003) and is also made in Rajan
and Reichelstein (2009).
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V R. Moreover, the agent is of limited wealth such that wage paymentswi must not
fall short of a certain minimum level wmin  0.2 Limited liability will be the main
difference to the analysis of McLeod (2003), who assumes that wages have to be
nonnegative, but precludes corner solutions by assuming limw!0 U(w) =  1.
The principal is risk neutral and wants to maximize her gross benefit net of
wage payments. I focus on the principal’s problem to implement a certain action
a0 2 A at minimal cost (cf. Grossman and Hart 1983). This can be stated as
follows
min
w1;:::wn
w (1)
s.t.
nX
i=1
pi(a
0)U(wi)  C(a0)  V R (2)
a0 2 argmax
a2A
(
nX
i=1
pi(a)U(wi)  C(a)
)
(3)
wi  w (4)
wi  wmin: (5)
The principal wants to minimize her total payment w, subject to the familiar par-
ticipation constraint (2) and incentive compatibility constraint (3). The budget
constraint (4) requires that all wages have to be smaller than the principal’s total
payment w, and the liability constraint (5) demands that the agent’s wage must
not fall short of his liability level wmin.
Under MLRP and CDFC, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (3)
2Nonnegativity of wmin is only assumed for ease of exposition. wmin < 0 would require
upfront payments of the agent.
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can be replaced by a first order condition3, which takes the form
nX
i=1
p0i(a
0)wi   C 0(a0) = 0; (6)
stating that a0 is a stationary point of the agent’s action choice problem.
3 Results
Without a binding liability constraint, MacLeod (2003) derives a wage compres-
sion result in the sense that the optimal contract is dichotomous and pays a bonus
for all but the worst outcome. In the present model, however, this in general is no
longer the case when the agent’s liability constraint becomes binding. To see this,
consider the agent’s incentive constraint (6). Due to theMLRP and the assumption
of a non-moving support of Y , p0i(a
0) is negative at least for the worst realization
i = 1. Any wage payment for this outcome hinders incentives. Consequently, also
in MacLeod’s (2003) model no bonus is paid. The compensation under y1 only
serves to provide some expected utility for the agent, helping to meet his partici-
pation constraint. If the agent’s liability constraint is binding, however, this is no
longer necessary. If the agent earns a rent from his limited liability, for instance,
the principal will preclude bonus payments for all realizations of Y for which
p0i(a
0) < 0 in order to increase incentives. For notational convenience, denote
by Y (a0) = fyi j p0i(a0) < 0g the set of realizations for which this is the case,
and its complement by Y+(a0) = Y nY (a0), and let P (a0) =
P
Y  pi(a
0) and
P+(a
0) =
P
Y+
pi(a
0) be the probabilities of these sets. Using this notation, the
3A proof is in the appendix
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above arguments are formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The solution to the principal’s implementation problem given by
(1), (2), (6), (4) and (5) has the following structure:
1. If none of the liability constraints (5) is binding, the agent’s wage is two-step
with
wi =
8>><>>:
U 1

V R + C(a0)  R1(a0)
R01(a0)
C 0(a0)

if i = 1
U 1

V R + C(a0) + 1 R1(a
0)
R01(a0)
C 0(a0)

else:
(7)
2. If some liability constraint (5) is binding and the agent earns a rent such that
his participation constraint (2) is not binding, the agent’s wage is two-step
with
wi =
8>><>>:
wmin if yi 2 Y (a0)
U 1

U(smin) + C
0(a0)
P 0+(a0)

if yi 2 Y+(a0):
(8)
3. If some liability constraint (5) and the agent’s participation constraint (2)
are binding, the agent’s wage is three-step with
wi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
wmin if i < i^
w^ 2 [wmin; w] if i = i^
w if i > i^
(9)
for some i^ with yi^ 2 Y (a0).
Proposition 1 describes how the optimal contract changes with liability mat-
ters. Only if the liability constraint is not binding, the contract proposed by
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MacLeod (2003) persists, and a bonus is refused only for the worst possible per-
formance. If on the other hand the liability constraint binds but the participation
constraint does not, a bonus payment is refused for all signal realizations which
convey bad news about the agent’s action. If both the liability constraint and the
participation constraint are binding, the optimal contract is “between” these two
extremes, refusing the bonus payment only for some lower levels of the signal
conveying bad news. For higher level of the signal, conveying news which are
“bad, but not too bad”, the same bonus is paid as under good news. The extend of
this leniency depends on the severity of the liability constraint. The more severe
the liability constraint is, the less freehanded the principal will be in distributing
the bonus. Therefore, all aspiration levels from “no complete failure” up to “good
news” may be observed in practice.
This property of the optimal contract remains even if a verifiable performance
measure is available. For this situation and unlimited liability, Rajan and Re-
ichelstein (2009) derive a “super wage compression” result in the sense that the
unverifiable measure is only used for the worst outcome of the verifiable mea-
sure, and for this worst verifiable performance the compensation is only cut for
the worst outcome of the unverifiable measure. With binding liability limits, how-
ever, the optimal contract again may vary from this wage compression contract
to a “rewarding only good news” contract as described above. To formalize this,
let X 2 fx1; : : : ; xmg be the verifiable measure and denote by pij(a) the prob-
ability of (yi; xj) under action a. Similar to the notation above, let XY (a0) =
(yi; xj) j p0ij(a0) < 0
	
the set of outcomes conveying bad news about the agent’s
action, and XY+(a0) =

(yi; xj) j p0ij(a0) < 0
	
be the set with good news.
Then, the optimal contract specifies wages wij = w(yi; xj) and bonus pools
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wj = w(xj) as follows:
Corrollary 1 The solution to the principal’s implementation problem under ver-
ifiable and unverifiable information has the following structure:
1. If none of the liability constraints is binding, the agent’s wage is
wij =
8>><>>:
w11 > 0 if j = 1; i = 1
wj else
(10)
2. If some liability constraint is binding and the agent earns a rent such that
his participation constraint is not binding, the agent’s wage is
wi =
8>><>>:
wmin if (yi; xj) 2 XY (a0)
wj if (yi; xj) 2 XY+(a0):
(11)
3. If some liability constraint and the agent’s participation constraint are bind-
ing, the agent’s wage is
wi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
wmin if
p0ij(a
0)
pij(a0)
<
p0
i^j^
(a0)
pi^j^(a
0)
w^ 2 [wmin; wj] if i = i^; j = j^
wj if
p0ij(a
0)
pij(a0)
>
p0
i^j^
(a0)
pi^j^(a
0)
(12)
for some (^i; j^) with (yi^; xj^) 2 XY (a0).
Again, there exists a critical outcome (yi^; xj^). If the likelihood ratio p
0
ij(a
0)=pij(a
0)
falls short of that of (yi^; xj^), only the minimumwage is paid. If the likelihood ratio
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is higher, the bonus pool is fully distributed to the agent. Different to the setting
with only unverifiable information, the size of this bonus pool wj may vary for
different levels of the verifiable signal X .
4 Discussion and conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown that under subjective performance evaluation,
wage compression as well as rewarding only good news and solutions in between
may occur. Since liability limits are not an issue in situations where the agent’s
reservation utility is high, wage compression is more likely in situations where
the agent has rather attractive outside options. Then, the harder punishments un-
der the “rewarding only good news” regime would prevent the agent from signing
a contract that is not too expensive for the principal. With poor outside options,
however, the agent is willing to swallow this pill as long as it is not too bitter.
Therefore, compressed bonus schemes should predominantly be observed in in-
dustries where competition for workers is high. Empirical evidence can be found
in the banking sector, where bonuses are almost obligatory. Wage floors, on the
other hand, are likely to result in more demanding targets and less compressed
bonus schemes.
A Proof of the validity of the first-order approach
This section proofs that in the principal’s optimization problem (1)–(5), the agent’s
incentive constraint (3) can be substituted by the first-order condition (6). To that
purpose, I follow the arguments of Rogerson (1985) to show that under the op-
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timal compensation scheme, the agent’s expected utility is a concave function of
his effort if the MLRP and the CDFC are fulfilled. So denote (1)–(5) as the un-
relaxed program. In the relaxed program, (3) is replaced by (6). In addition, it is
useful to define the doubly relaxed program in which the incentive constraint (3)
is replaced by the inequality
nX
i=1
p0i(a
0)wi   C 0(a0)  0: (13)
The second relaxation mainly serves as a technical device to proof the monotonic-
ity of the compensation scheme:
Lemma 1 If w = (w1; : : : ; wn) is a solution to the doubly relaxed program, it is
nondecreasing in Y , i.e. wi  wi+1 for i = 1; : : : ; n  1.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. So suppose that si > si+1 for some i.
With that in mind, inspect the first-order conditions of the doubly relaxed program
with respect to wi and wi+1,
U 0(wi)pi(a0) + U 0(wi)p0i(a
0)  i + i
and
U 0(wi+1)pi+1(a0) + U 0(wi+1)p0i+1(a
0)  i+1 + i+1:
 and  denote the multipliers of the participation constraint (2) and the incentive
compatibility constraint (13), whereas i and i are the multipliers of the bonus
pool constraints (4) and the liability constraints (5). By definition, all multipliers
are non-negative. Since si > si+1, the liability constraint will not be binding for
wi, therefore i = 0. From the same relation, it follows that the budget constraint
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will be slack under wi+1, thus i+1 = 0. By the nonnegativity of i and i+1, it
follows that
U 0(wi)pi(a0) + U 0(wi)p0i(a
0)  0
and
U 0(wi+1)pi+1(a0) + U 0(wi+1)  0
or, by U 0 > 0 and pi(a0) > 0,
+ 
p0i(a
0)
pi(a0)
 0
and
+ 
p0i+1(a
0)
pi+1(a0)
 0
Due to the MLRP, both conditions can only be fulfilled if  = 0. Then, however,
the principal would do best by offering a flat wage, which contradicts the initial
assumption.
Given the monotonicity of wages, it is straightforward to proof the concavity
of the agent’s expected utility:
Lemma 2 If w = (w1; : : : ; wn) is a solution to the doubly relaxed program, the
agent’s expected utility under w is a concave function of his action a
Proof Consider the agent’s expected utility under w,
E [U(wi) j a] =
nX
i=1
U(wi)pi(a)  C(a);
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and rewrite it in utility differences i = U(wi+1)  U(wi),
E [U(wi) j a] = U(w1) +
n 1X
i=1
i(1  Pi(a))  C(a): (14)
By Lemma 1, i  0. the monotonicity of (14) then follows by the CDFC and
the convexity of the cost function C.
Next, I proof that the solutions of the relaxed program and the doubly relaxed
program are identical.
Lemma 3 If in the doubly relaxed program an action a > a is implemented, the
incentive constraint (13) is binding in its optimal solution.
Proof If The incentive constraint would not bind, it could likewise be dropped.
Then, the principal would do best stipulating a flat wage. Under a flat wage,
however, only the least costly action a can be implemented.
The last step is to proof that the solutions of the relaxed program and the
unrelaxed program coincide:
Proposition 2 If the MLRP and the CDFC hold, each solution to the relaxed
program is also a solution to the unrelaxed program.
Proof By lemma 3, the solutions to the relaxed program and the doubly re-
laxed program coincide. Consequently, lemma 1 and 2 also apply to the relaxed
program. By the concavity of the agent’s expected utility, the stationary point
described by (6) is identical to the solution to the incetive constraint (15) of the
unrelaxed program.
12
B Proofs of propositions
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
1. The first claim is identical to that in proposition 6 in MacLeod (2003) and
can be proven similarly.
2. To prove the second claim, consider the first-order condition
@L
@wi
= pi(a
0)U 0(wi) + p0i(a
0)U 0(wi)  i + i = 0 (15)
with respect to wi, where  and  are the multipliers of the participation
constraint (2) and the incentive compatibility constraint (6), and i and i
denote the multipliers of the budget constraint (4) and the liability constraint
(5) under the outcome yi. If the agent earns a rent,  = 0 will hold. Fur-
thermore, the validity of the first-order approach implies that the incentive
constraint (6) will be binding and thus  > 0 for all a > a. From this and
the nonnegativity of i and i it follows that i > 0 and thus wi = smin
must hold whenever pi(a0) < 0. Contrary, pi(a0) > 0 implies that i > 0
and thus wi = w. This establishes the binary structure of the compensation
scheme. The size of the bonus pool can then be derived from the binding
incentive constraint.
3. As above, consider the first-order condition (15). First suppose pi(a) > 0.
Since  > 0 by assumption and again  > 0 holds, vi > 0 must hold and
wi = w. Next, consider the case pi(a) < 0 and suppose that both the budget
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constraint and the liability constraint do not hold. Then,
@L
@wi
= pi(a
0)U 0(wi) + p0i(a
0)U 0(wi) = 0
or p0i(a)=p(a) = = must hold. By strict MLRP, this can only be the
case for one single realization i = i^. By the monotonicity of the incentive
scheme it follows that wi = wmin for i < i^ and wi = w for i > i^.
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